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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE M. CHILD 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 18169 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of a decision of the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, finding, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) § 35-4-S(a), that plaintiff voluntarily 
left work without good cause. In making its decision, the 
Board of Review adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the decision of the Appeals Referee, dated December l, 
1981. (R.0010) The Appeals Referee held that the plaintiff was 
ineligible for Unemployment Compensation benefits beginning 
August 16, 1981, and ending when she had earned wages in bona 
fide covered employment equal to at least six times her weekly 
benefit amount and is otherwise eligible. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, through its Board 
of Review, affirmed the previous decisions of the Department 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests the Court to· reverse the holding 
of the Board of Review and enter its judgment that defendant's 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that 
plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to Unemployment 
compensation benefits from August 16, 1981, until she is no 
longer otherwise eligible. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are clear, simple, and uncontroverted. 
Plaintiff left her employment with Weber State College in 
Ogden, Utah, on August 14, 1981. She had been employed there 
as a secretary for seven months. (R.0026-0027) 
The reason plaintiff gave for her termination was 
that she was moving to Sacramento, California, where her husband 
began attending law school on August 24, 1981. In order for her 
to retain her marriage and family relationship it was necessary 
for her to move with him. Plaintiff's husband was accepted to 
a school in California and placed on a waiting list at the 
University of Utah Law School. Plaintiff did not know exactly 
if, and when, she would need to terminate her employment and 
move with her husband. The resignation she submitted to Weber 
State College was contingent upon her being required to leave 
Utah. Plaintiff did not search for employment prior to her move 
to California because she was not certain she would be moving 
there more than one week before her move. (R.0027-0028) 
Plaintiff left Utah on August 16, 1981, and arrived in 
California on August 17, 1981. She immediately started making 
applications for employment and on September 14, 1981, she was 
-2-
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hired by E.F. Hutton and Company, Inc., as an Administrative 
Assistant to the Regional Vice President of Consulting Services. 
Prior to her obtaining employment, plaintiff had made an active 
job search. The employer•s representative did not controvert 
any of appellant's contentions. (R.0027-0029) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF LACKED 
GOOD CAUSE FOR VOLUNTARILY LEAVING HER EMPLOY-
MENT WAS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, UNSUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH ITS OWN REGULATIONS OR THE UTAH EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY ACT. 
The appropriate standard of review in a case such as 
this is stated in Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 420 P.2d 45, 
(1966): 
A reversal of an order of the Industrial 
Commission denying compensation can only 
be justified if there is no substantial 
evidence to sustain the determination and 
there is proof of facts giving rise to the 
right of compensation so clear and per-
suasive that the Commission's refusal to 
accept it and make an award was clearly 
capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. 
Citing Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees 
v. Department of Employment Security, 13 
U.2d 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion that 
where a decision of the Industrial Commission is unsupported 
by substantial evidence, a reversal of the order is appropriate. 
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 
25 U.2d 131, 477 P.2d 587 (1970); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees 
v. Department of Employment Security, supra., Gonzales v. Board 
Of Review, Department of Employment Security, No. 17554 (Ut. 
September 22, 1981). 
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In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission, 
the supreme Court is required to review the record below. 
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, 
supra., Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 626 (Ut. 1977). Furthermore, the Court is not bound by 
conclusions of the Board of Review and will not substitute missing 
findings in order to corroborate a decision of the Industrial 
Commission which is not supported by the record. Gocke v. 
Wiesley, supra., at 46. 
The decisions of the Industrial Commission are not 
automatically affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court, in Blamires 
v. Board of Review, Etc., 584 P.2d 889, at 892 (Ut. 1978), 
held: 
The findings of the Board are only final 
and binding upon us when supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. 
Whitcombe v. Dept. of Emp. Sec. Ind. 
Q.Qmm., 563 P.2d 807 (Ut. 1977). 
In the present case, the decision of the Board of Review, denying 
unemployment benefits to the plaintiff, was not supported by 
substantial competent evidence and, therefore, must be reversed. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §35-4-5(a) denies benefits 
to a claimant who voluntarily leaves work without good cause: 
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by 
the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has perfonned services in 
bona fide covered employment and earned wages 
for such services equal to at least six times 
the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provided, 
that no claimant shall be ineligible for benefits 
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances 
of such a nature that it would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The commission shall in cooperation with the 
employer consider for the purposes of this 
act, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to 
the labor market in reaching a determination 
of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is 
contrary to equity and good conscience. 
The General Rules of Adjudication of the Utah Department of 
Employment Security (U.D.E.S.) at VOLUNTARY LEAVING§ 210 
further define what constitutes "good cause". This section 
states: 
"Good cause" as used in unemployment insurance 
is cause which would justify an employee's 
voluntarily leaving work and becoming unem-
ployed; the leaving must be for reasons which 
would reasonably motivate in a similar situation 
the average worker to give. up employment with 
its wage rewards to become unemployed. To 
constitute good cause, the circumstances which 
compel the decision to leave must be real, not 
imaginary; substantial, not trifling; and 
reasonable, not whimsical. There must be 
some compulsion from outside and necessitous 
circumstances. The standard of what constitutes 
good cause is the standard of reasonableness as 
applied to the average individual and not to 
supersensitive. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Denby v. Bd. of Review of Indus. 
£2.!!!!!t., supra., at 630, further defines "good cause". Justice 
Maughan, in his decision for the Court, stated: 
"Good cause"has been defined as "such cause 
as would similarly affect persons of reason-
able and normal sensitivity, and is limited 
to those instances where the unemployment 
is caused by external pressures so compelling 
that a reasonably prudent person, exercising 
ordinary common sense and prudence, would be 
justified in quitting under similar circum-
stances." (Citation omitted) Accord, Mills 
v. Gronning, 581 P.2d 1334 (Ut. 1978). 
Once a voluntary quit is established or admitted, the 
claimant has the burden of establishing the termination was with 
good cause. U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication, at VOLUNTARY 
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LEAVING§ 190.01; Denby v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm., supra., 
at 630. Plaintiff has conceeded that she terminated her employ-
ment with Weber State College (R.0027) and has accepted the 
burden of establishing her termination was for "good cause." 
Plaintiff explained at her telephone hearing the reason 
she terminated her employment. In response to the Appeals 
Referee's request for an explanation, she testified: "Ah, 
my husband was going to attend law school here in California 
and in order to retain our marriage and our family relationship, 
it was necessary for me to quit my employment and move with 
him." ( R. 0027) The record further substantiates this assertion. 
(R.0013-0018, 0032-0034, 0040, 0042, 0043, 0044) 
The U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication, at 
VOLUNTARY LEAVING § 50 provides: 
As the Act does not specify that good cause 
for leaving must be attributable to the 
employer, all circumstances surrounding the 
separation, personal, or job connected, 
should be considered in determining whether 
a disqualification applies. (emphasis added) 
Section 155.2 further provides: 
When an individual voluntarily leaves a job 
to move to another locality, the reason for 
moving must be examined. Moving for a com-
pelling reason such as to accompany a spouse 
who was transferred to a new job out of the 
area could indicate a good cause for leaving 
a job. 
Compelling personal reasons alone are considered as 
"good cause" for terminating employment voluntarily under the 
Utah statute. Defendant's regulations, as cited above, reflect 
this interpretation and, infact, urge examination of personal 
circumstances in determining eligibility. 
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The Appeals Referee's decision, adopted by the Board 
of Review as their final decision, (R.0010) made the following 
Findings of Fact, Conunents and Conclusion of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Prior to filing a claim for unemployment 
insurance benefits effective August 16, 1981, 
the claimant earned $780 per month working as 
a secretary for Weber State College from 
January 26, 1981, to August 14, 1981. Her 
weekly benefit amount is $94 for 36 weeks. 
2. The claimant voluntarily left her employment 
to relocate with her husband in Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia. He had been accepted into law school 
there. Neither the claimant nor her husband 
had any definite prospects of employment. 
3. The claimant began working for E.F. Hutton 
as an Administrative Assistant on September 14, 
1981, at $950 per month. 
COMMENTS: 
Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provides as shown on the attached sheet. 
When an individual voluntarily leaves gainful 
employment to move to another locality, the 
reasons for moving must be examined. Moving 
for a compelling reason such as a spouse's 
being transferred by an employer or who has a 
guarantee of a new job is considered to be 
good cause. However, quitting a job for a non-
compelling reason such as a desire to relocate 
to another area to seek work or be close to 
family is not held to be good cause. 
In determining good cause, the Utah Employment 
Security Act stresses that a spouse must be 
moving to accept substantial employment. In 
the present case, the claimant's spouse was 
moving to attend school and the family was to 
accompany him. It is therefore held, the 
claimant voluntarily left work for personal 
non-compelling reasons and it is not considered 
good cause in accordance with the Utah Employment 
Security Act. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The Appeals Referee, therefore, finds: 
The claimant voluntarily left work without 
good cause. (R.0023-0024) 
The Appeals Referee correctly states that in determining 
whether a voluntary termination of employment due to a move to 
another locality is disqualifying the reasons for such a move 
must be examined. However, his reasoning and application of 
the law is flawed. 
First, the Appeals Referee's premises assume his 
conclusion. His decision states: "Quitting a job for a non-
compelling reason such as a desire to relocate to another area 
to seek work or be closer to family is not held to be good 
cause." (R.0023) It is precisely those elements that must 
be examined to determine whether the termination is compelling. 
In other words, his decision presupposes that a claimant who 
terminates his or her employment for a reason other than a 
transfer of the spouse to new employment or a guarantee of new 
employment is presumed to be non-compelling. 
Second, the Appeals Referee stated that: "In deter-
mining good cause, the Utah Employment Security Act stresses 
that a spouse must be moving to accept substantial employment." 
(R.0024) This contention is totally unfounded. The Appeals 
Referee provides no support for his contention and plaintiff is 
unaware of the existence of any authorative suppprt. Defendant's 
own regulations, as cited above, U.D.E.s. General Rules of 
Adjudication, at VOLUNTARY LEAVING§§ 50, 155.2, provide that 
all circumstances should be examined when an individual leaves 
a job to move to another locality. Indeed, these regulations 
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provide a presumption that a compelling reason such as accompanying 
a spouse who was transferred to a new job indicates good cause, 
but does not limit a conclusion only to those facts. Therefore, 
it is clear the defendant misperceived and misapplied the law. 
Plaintiff submits the record supports a finding that 
her termination was for personal compelling reasons that were 
neither frivolous nor whimsical. Plaintiff's only option other 
than terminating her employment would have been to remain in 
Utah while her husband moved to California and established 
his permanent residence there. Plaintiff's decision to accompany 
her husband is based on the long standing tradition of the family 
relationship. To argue that a reasonable person would abrogate 
the responsibility of a lawful marriage and family relationship 
in order to comply with an arbitrary interpretation of a statute 
by the defendant is repugnant to public policy. 
The state has a vested interest in protecting the 
integrity of the family unit. To apply the interpretation the 
defendant gives to Utah Code Annotated (1953) §35-4-5(a) would 
be to ignore the importance, desirability and function of the 
family unit. It stretches the imagination to believe that a 
reasonable person in a situation similar to that of the plaintiff 
would be compelled to make a decision contrary to the one made 
by the plaintiff. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Briggs v. Industrial 
Commission, 539 P.2d 1303 (Colo. App. 1975), at 1304-5, stated 
that: 
First of all, we rule that one who becomes un-
employed as the result of leaving employment 
in order to travel to another place to live with 
his or her spouse has not "voluntarily" left work. 
The pressure of family and marital responsibilities 
-9-
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and claimant's capitulation to,~t~h·em--~t·r•a·n·s~f ..... o~rm ... ~~ 
what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment into 
involuntary unemployment. Bliley Electric Co. 
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
45 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1946). Indeed, it would be 
repugnant to public policy, which encourages 
and promotes the family as a social unit in 
society, to require that a husband, in certain 
circumstances, be denied unemployment benefits 
merely because he chooses to live with his wife. 
Although the statute under which Briggs was decided was declared 
unconstitutional on other bases, the Colorado Court of Appeals 
later in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Com. v. Dept. of Labor and 
Employment, 579 P.2d 65 (Col. App. 1978), held that the rational 
of Briggs, as quoted above, remained viable. The court also 
made reference to Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Com. v. Dept. of 
Labor and Employment, 559 P.2d 252 (Col. App. 1976) where they 
affirmed an award of benefits to a wife who left her job to 
accompany her husband who was attending college in another state. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Coma v. Depto of Labor 
and Employment, 579 P.2d 65 (Col. App. 1978) was reversed in 
592 P.2d 808 (Col. 1979) without reaching the issue of whether 
a married woman who terminates her employment in order to relocate 
with her husband is deemed to be unavoidably unemployed within the 
meaning of a special Colorado statute. Although the statutes used 
by the Colorado courts are and were different from Utah's statute, 
plaintiff submits that the reasoning of the Colorado Court of 
Appeals is consistent with the Utah statute and the construction 
urged by a liberal interpretation. Johnson v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission, 320 P.2d 315 (Ut. 1958). 
Also, in Ayers v. Employment Security Dept., 536 Po 2d 
610 (Washo 1975), at 611-12, the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
Many factors may enter into the decision of a 
family as to where they shall live and work. 
It is often a substantial factor to be con-
sidered that it is desirable f ,...._,..i..w.4.1~~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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~ ~b·b~~~ee)flJ'~the family together. If 
employment for the husband and for the 
wife are not available in the same area, 
it is a compelling personal reason, and 
therefore, good cause, for one of the 
spouses to leave employment and go to the 
place of employment of the other spouse in 
order to keep the family together. The 
decision of which place of employment should 
be accepted must not be governed by any 
arbitrary rule, but should be decided upon 
a consideration Of all relevant factors. 
It is generally a decision which the spouses 
should make for themselves, subject to the 
need to make a reasonable decision. 
Wherefore, plaintiff submits that the defendant has 
misperceived and misapplied the law in her situation and urges the 
court to apply a construction of Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
§ 35-4-S(a), that promotes the purposes of the Utah Employment 
Security Act while, at the same time, strengthens and protects the 
integrity of the family unit. A contrary holding would send a clear 
signal to the defendant commission that the only compelling reason 
a spouse may have to terminate his or her employment with good cause 
is to accompany the other spouse who has been transferred by an 
employer or who has a guarantee of a new job. Such an inflexible 
interpretation would vitiate any other compelling reason that 
would force a person to terminate his or her employment in order 
to maintain and promote a family relationship. As stated above, 
the state has a vested interest in protecting the family unit. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S DETERMINATION THAT IT WOULD NOT 
BE CONTRARY TO EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO 
IMPOSE A DISQUALIFICATION AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE IT IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff has not established 
good cause for leaving her employment, it would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience to find that her actions are dis-
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qualifying under the Utah Employment Security Act. 1 The Act 
provides that: 
(N)o claimant shall be ineligible for benefits 
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances 
of such a nature that it would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience to impose a dis-
qualification. 
The Commission shall in cooperation with the 
employer consider for the purposes of this 
act, the reasonableness of claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the a~tions evidence 
a genuine continuing attachment to the labor 
market in reaching a determination of whether 
the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary 
to equity and good conscience. U.C.A. section 
35-4-5(a). 
This provision is further discussed in the department's regulation~ 
U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication at VOLUNTARY LEAVING 
Section 210 provides that: 
If it is determined that "good cause" does not 
exist, then the surrounding circumstances must 
be reviewed to determine whether the claimant's 
actions were such that a disqualification under 
this section of law would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience. The statute requires that 
three factors be considered in making a deter-
mination of whether equity and good conscience 
required the disqualification to be abated: 
1. The purposes of the Employment Security Act; 
2. The reasonableness of the claimant's actions; 
and 
3. The extent to which the claimant• s actions 
evidence a genuine attachment to the labor 
market. 
1Plaintiff submitted this argument to the Appeals Referee 
(R.0035-0037) however, he failed to make any express findings 
regarding plaintiff's contentions. Plaintiff also alleged the 
same contentions before the Board of Review (R.0016-0017). By 
adopting the decision of the Appeals Referee the Board also made 
no express findings. However, plaintiff submits that the Appeals 
Referee's decisions impliedly rejects plaintiff's contentions and 
is subject to. review by this court. 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,-c__ '·( '-r 
Prior to the 1979 amendments to the Employment 
Security Act, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
on several occasions that the purpose of the 
Act was to assist the worker and his family 
in times when, without fault on his part, he 
was out of work and to provide stabilitv for 
the economy by assuring continuity of pur-
chasing power. The 1979 amendments altered that 
purpose to the extent that although a claimant 
may be "at fault" in his resulting unemployment, 
he will not be disqualified from receiving 
benefits if the actions which led to his 
unemployment evidence a degree of reason-
ableness under the circumstances and 
demonstrate a genuine continuing attachment 
to the labor market. Any determination involv-
ing mitigating circumstances must be made with 
a sensitive regard for fairness to the parties. 
Thus, the statute and defendant's regulations, require 
three factors that must be considered in making this determination. 
First, the purposes of the Employment security Act. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
!!=£,., 134 P.2d 479 (Ut. 1943) at 485, held that the Act's purpose 
is: 
(R)emedial to protect the health, morals, 
and welfare of the people by providing a 
cushion against the shock and rigors of 
unemployment. Being remedial under the 
police powers and not imposing limitations 
on basic rights, it should be liberally 
construed. (emphasis added) 
Further, the Employment Security Act is to be liberally 
construed and administered and the prerogatives of the Commission 
are necessarily to be exercised in accordance with the social 
purposes of the Act. Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, supra. Also, it has been held in Utah's sister state, 
Colorado, that the courts in construing the Act should apply the 
construction which favors the claimant. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 540 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1975). 
Since the purpose of the act is remedial to provide a 
cushion to the shock, and rigors of unemployment and is to impose 
-13-
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-no limitation on basic rights, this factor balances in favor of 
plaintiff in determining whether it would be against equity and 
good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
Second, the reasonableness of plaintiff's actions must 
be considered. Although plaintiff submitted to the Appeal's 
Referee her contentions regarding this argument (R.0037) he made 
no specific findings as to plaintiff's reasonableness, nor did the 
Board of Review. However, his decision impliedly rejects plaintif 
contentions of reasonableness, and wrongfully so. 
As established in Point I, infra.; plaintiff's termination 
of her employment was not an act of an unreasonable person. On 
the contrary, it is not conceivable that a successful marriage 
could exist with the partners permanently residing in different 
states. Plaintiff, reasonably realizing this fact, made a deliber 
decision which was not whimsical or rash and not unlike that of an 
other reasonable person similarly situated. Therefore, this facto 
also balances in favor of the plaintiff. 
Third, plaintiff's actions must evidence a genuine 
attachment to the labor market. The record reflects that plaintif 
terminated her employment on August 14, 1981. (R. 0026, 0032, 0039 
0042, 0044) She left Utah on August 16, 1981, and arrived in 
California on August 17, 1981. (R.0027) She registered for work 
at the employment office on August 19, 1981, (R.0040-0045)2 and 
made an active job search. (R. 003 2) 
2P1aintiff testified that she registered for employment on 
August 20, 1981 (R.0027), however, her applications are all dated 
August 19, 1981, the day she actually registered for work. 
-14-
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She became employed on September 14, 1981, as an Administrative 
Assistant at E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc., where she is presently 
employed. (R.0028) 
These actions clearly evidence that plaintiff was 
genuinely attached to the labor market. Indeed, she terminated 
her employment only two days before leaving Utah and registered 
for work only two days after arriving in California. She became 
steadily employed exactly one month after she left Utah. such a 
diligent effort evidences a genuine attachment to the labor 
market. 
Therefore, the weight of the evidence substantiates 
that an imposition of a disqualification would be contrary to 
equity and good conscience and the defendant erred in not so 
finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has established that terminating her 
employment for the personally compelling reason of accompanying 
her husband who moved out of the state to attend school was for 
good cause under the Utah Employment Security Act. Defendant's 
detennination to the contrary is not supported by substantial 
evidence and should be reversed. In addition, the imposition 
of a disqualification would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience. 
DATED this /!}'~y of March, 1981, 
Respectfully Submitted, 
~cJl:l· cJdL 
P Se 
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